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Introduction 
This article will address selected legal issues relating to the treatment of detainees l in the context of the "Global War on Terror" as a "hook" on 
which to hang some ideas of morc general application and significance about the 
international legal framework of the "war." Some general (i.e .,jusad bellum) inter-
national law aspects of the parameters of that framework have already been de-
bated in the literature/ but the perspective adopted herein is of more specialist 
focus inasmuch as it concentrates on the practical issue that should resonate in the 
mind of all coalition military and associated personnel since the disclosure of ill-
treatment of detainees in the custody of US and British forces in Iraq at Abu Ghraib 
and elsewhere:3 namely, once suspects in the "War on Terror" are captured, in ac-
cordance with what rules and legal standards are they to be treated? The broader, 
fundamental, more theoretical (but no less important) issue lurking behind this 
question of detailed substance is one of the utmost practical significance for per-
sonnel deployed to military counterterrorist operations in the field in the setting of 
the "Global War on Terror": does the "War on Terror" constitute an armed 
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conflict in the sense of international law? And if so, what kind of armed conflict is 
it: international, non-international or something else? 
The premise contained herein, in a nutshell, is that military and political deci-
sionmakers in the coalition countries (principally, for the purposes of this article, 
the United States and the United Kingdom) have mentally placed the proverbial 
"chicken before the egg," in that they have completely failed to consider the very 
real implications that these considerations have on armed fo rces fro m a legal point 
of view. When soldiers are deployed on military operations, they need to know the 
context of and legal framework governing their actions. When in action against 
" terrorists" in Afghanistan, are coalition troops subject to (and expected to apply) 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions,4 or Additional Protocols I or II thereto?S If so, do 
they apply all their provisions, or only some of them? The legal problem has been 
particularly acute when armed forces have been given instructions which, while 
vague on details, have tended to undermine respect for the law of armed conflict in 
general.6 As one noted former member of the US armed forces has succinctly put it: 
I can understand why some administration lawyers might have wanted ambiguity so 
that every hypothetical option is theoretically open, even those the President has said 
he does not want to exercise. But war doesn't occur in theory and our troops are not 
served by ambiguity. They are crying out for clari ty.7 
The structure of this article will be, first , to consider some specific issues in cur-
rent legal proceedings in both the United Kingdom and the United States regard-
ing treatment of detainees in custody, before moving to the broader picture of the 
general legal framework and classification of the "Global War on Terror." The lat-
ter discussion will involve a brief review of recent relevant decisions by the US and 
Israeli Supreme Courts as well as a comparison with the situation confronted by 
British security forces in Northern Ireland during the "Troubles"8 as a limited pre-
decessor for such a "war." At the end, we will return to the specific starting point 
about legal standards for the treatment of detainees in military custody in light of 
the foregoing discussion about the nature and classification of the conflict, and 
draw some conclusions with suggestions for a possible way forward in what has be-
come a veritable legal and moral minefield. 
Recent Legal Developments in the United Kingdom 
The AI-Skein; Litigation 
On June 13, 2007 the House of Lords (sitting in its judicial capacity as the highest 
court in the United Kingdom) gave its judgment in a long-running saga 
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concerning the treatment of detainees in Iraq, namely, the AI-Skeini case.9 Claims 
for compensation are now being brought by the family of Baha Mousa against the 
British Ministry of Defence as a direct result of this judgment by the House of 
Lords,lo although it represents the final stage in the instant litigation. 
In the Al-Skeini affair there have been two separate limbs: the civil proceedings 
which culminated in the House of Lords decision, and military proceedings at 
court-martial. The situation which gave rise to both sets of proceedings involved 
the deaths of six Iraqi civilians at the hands of British troops in Basra between Au-
gust and November 2003--in other words, during the period in which the United 
Kingdom, along with the United States, was internationally recognized as being in 
belligerent occupation of Iraq. II The court-martial case will be mentioned further 
below. The applicants in the civillitigation 12 were close relatives of the six dead 
Iraqi civilians. They sought an order of judicial review against the Secretary of State 
for Defence by way of challenge to his refusal to order an independent public in-
quiry into the circumstances in which their relatives died and his rejection ofliabil-
ity to pay compensation for their deaths. Five of the deceased were shot by British 
troops while exchanging fire with Iraqi insurgents, during patrols or house 
searches,13 but the most famous one is the sixth, whose circumstances were some-
what different. Baha Mousa was a young hotel receptionist who was taken into cus-
tody by British troops during a search of his hotel. Within thirty-six hours he was 
dead, apparently having been beaten to death by British troops while in their cus-
tody at the military base of Darul Dhyafa in Basra. 14 
The legal issue in the case turned on the extraterritorial application of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA),15 which is the domestic British incorporation of the 
United Kingdom's international obligations under the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR).16 The claimants' arguments were essentially that Iraqi ci-
vilian detainees in British military custody in Iraq were entitled to the protection of 
the HRA and therefore (indirectly) of the ECHR; the core question was thus one of 
jurisdiction. Throughout the earlier proceedings in the Divisional Court and the 
Court of Appeal, 17 and also in the House of Lords, a clear distinction was drawn be-
tween the five Iraqis who were shot on the street or in house searches by British 
troops and the one, Baha Mousa, who died in the actual custody of British troops. 
This distinction was necessitated by the Convention's own insistence that "the 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in ... this Convention."18 In a confusing series of cases 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Court introduced and 
elaborated upon a notion of "effective control" over territory for the purposes of 
ECHR jurisdiction outside the "espace juridique"19 of the Convention, and a funda-
mental tension developed between two alternative conceptions of the extraterritorial 
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application of the ECHR during military operations by armed forces of ECHR 
State parties in States or other territorial entities that were not party to the Conven-
tion. 2(1 This was dearly the case in Iraq, as that State is not and never has been a 
party to the ECHR, whereas the United Kingdom is. The fundamental question, 
therefore, was whether the actions of British troops, deployed on military opera-
tions outside the United Kingdom, cou1d be subject to provisions of the Conven-
tion (by way of the HRA, which applies to all "public authorities" of the United 
Kingdom and makes it unlawful for such authorities to act in a way that is incom-
patible with a right under the ECHR).21 
Essentially what was conceded by the Ministry of Defence, and in the final stage 
of the House of Lords hearings22 was no longer contentious, was that the ECHR 
was in principle applicable to these cases. The first five deceased, however, because 
they were shot on the street or during patrols or house searches but were not in the 
physical custody of British troops, were held not to fall within the jurisdiction of 
the UK courts for the purposes of the hwnan rights legislation. In the House of 
Lords, the government was appealing against the findings (in both the Divisional 
Court and the Court of Appeal, albeit with slightly different reasoning) that it was 
liable in respect to Baha Mousa's death and that it could or should be ordered to 
hold the requested independent public inquiry into the circumstances thereof. 
Throughout the proceedings in AI-Skeini, at all three court levels, it was com-
mon ground that there were two possible legal reasons as to why the Iraqi claimants 
shou1d be brought within the jurisdiction of British human rights laws, even 
though they were not citizens of the United Kingdom and the acts in question oc-
curred outside the United Kingdom while British troops were engaged in military 
operations. These reasons were that, under the ECtHR decision in Bankovic,23 ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction of the ECHR could be based on either 
(1 ) the effective control of a State over a territory and its inhabitants, either 
as a resu1t of military occupation (whether lawful or unlawful in general 
international law), or with the consent, acquiescence or invitation of the 
government of that territory, such that the State in effective control 
actually exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by the government of that territory. This approach to 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is referred to for convenience as the "effective 
control of an area" (ECA) argwnent and was based on the ECtHR 
jurisprudence in the line of cases following Loizidou;24 or 
(2) the exercise of authority or control over a State's individuals by the 
activities of another State's official agents in its embassies, consulates, 
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military bases or prisons, or on board aircraft or vessels registered in or 
flying the flag of that State, wherein agents of the State are exercising the 
authority of the State extraterritorially in a foreign country. This 
approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction is referred to for convenience as 
the "State agent authority" (SAA) argument, and was based on an 
alternative jurisprudence of the ECtHR as expressed in Drozd and 
Janousek v. France and Spain.25 
The Divisional Court had limited the applicability of the ECA argument to terri-
tory within the espace juridique of the Convention and applied a narrow construc-
tion of the SAA argument, holding that it applied only in relation to "embassies, 
consulates, vessels and aircraft and .. . a prison. "26 Within those restrictive parame-
ters, the case of 8aha Mousa alone was considered justiciable. The SAA argument 
was also the preferred view of the Court of Appeal, although it additionally applied 
a broader interpretation of the ECA argument than the Divisional Court, in the 
sense that the majority opined that the ECA theory could apply anywhere in the 
world, even outside the espace juridique of the Convention, so long as the territory 
was under effective controL The appeals court was also more generous in its view of 
the SAA argument. It relied heavily on the decision in Issa and Others v. Turkey,27 a 
case in which the ECtHR gave "an unequivocal statement ofSAA responsibility in a 
military context"28 (lssa concerned the deaths of a number of Iraqi shepherds, al-
legedly at the hands of Turkish soldiers operating against Kurdish guerrillas in 
northern Iraq). The Court of Appeal effectively held, largely on public policy 
grounds, that "Article I [of the Convention] could not be interpreted so as to allow 
a State party to perpetrate violations of the ECHR on the territory of another State 
which it could not perpetrate on its own territory"29 and that the SAA theory ap-
plied whenever the individual in question was under the control and authority of 
the relevant State agents anywhere in the world. 
However, in the House of Lords judgment in AI-Skeini, a majority of the Law 
Lords was uncomfortable with the extremely broad approach of the Court of Ap-
peal, and chose to retrench the position considerably. In the leading judgment, 
Lord Brown dismissed the expansive extraterritorial application of the ECHR re-
gime proposed by the Court of Appeal in reliance on Issa as 
altogether too much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Bankovic [as 
to the Convention being an essentially regional instrument that was not designed to 
operate throughout the world] .... It would, indeed, make redundant the principle of 
effective control of an area: what need for that if jurisdiction arises in any event under a 
general principle of "authority and control" irrespective of whether the area is (a) 
effectively controlled or (b) within the Council of Europe?30 
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In connection with military forces and the law of armed conflict, Lord Brown 
noted that the requirements of effective occupation required that the occupying 
power respect the laws in force, rather than introducing new laws and enforcement 
mechanisms; indeed, in most parts of the world outside Europe the probability 
would be that ECHR rights would be incompatible with local law in any event.3! 
The cases of the first five claimants were therefore conclusively dismissed as falling 
outside the United Kingdom's jurisdiction for human rights purposes, while in re-
spect to the sixth claimant, Lord Brown agreed that Baha Mousa's case did indeed 
fall within the scope of the United Kingdom's obligations under the ECHR, but 
"only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional Court, essentially by 
analogy with the extra-territorial exception made for embassies."32 
Although it is perhaps still too early to make a full evaluation of the impact of the 
final decision in Al-Skeini, and a claim against the Ministry of Defence pursuant to 
the judgment in the litigation has only recently been made public,33 it is surely a de-
cision of enonnous significance because it means that British forces, when de-
ployed outside the United Kingdom on certain kinds of military operations, 
effectively will be carrying the obligations of the ECHR and the HRA with them. In 
other words, for the United Kingdom (and all other States that are party to the 
ECHR) questions of human rights will become increasingly important in situa-
tions where British troops are either in belligerent occupation of foreign territory 
or stationed in any fo reign territory in a situation other than full -scale interna-
tional armed conflict. This is a trend that has been gathering strength for some 
years; as the International Court of Justice has put it: 
[TJhe protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in time of armed 
conflict . ... As regards the relationship between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law, there are ... three possible situations: some rights may 
be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively 
matters of human rights laW; yet others may be matters of both these branches of 
internationallaw.34 
It is a fact that a major part of contemporary culture, especially in the West, is 
the demand for redress after injury. In the context of armed conflict, although 
there is a specialized mechanism for calling wrongdoers to account by criminal 
prosecution on charges of war crimes or similar, that is a lengthy and generally un-
satisfying process from the victims' perspective. All too often soldiers accused of 
criminal conduct are either acquitted (which may of course be for a variety of rea-
sons, some more readily understandable to the world outside the courtroom than 
others) or not even brought to trial. This is an allegation that might be made in the 
current context of securing accountability for misconduct by British troops in 
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Iraq,35 but it is nothing new: there were notoriously few prosecutions of German 
military officers and soldiers in the Reichsgencht at Leipzig fo r offenses allegedly 
committed in World War I, and most of those that took place resulted either in ac-
quittals or in derisorily lenient prison sentences.16 The growth in the importance of 
human rights law in relat ion to situations of occupation or other military deploy-
ment is inevitable, given that dvilli tigation for compensation is easier for claim-
ants to secure than criminal trials. In the United Kingdom, at least, we will 
doubtless be seeing more of these human rights cases for compensation being 
brought against the Ministry of Defence the longer our forces stay in theater. 
All of which is not to say that British forces will no longer be applying the law of 
armed conflict when they are deployed on operations abroad or will be looking at 
every military situation through the distorting lens of human rights obligations; it 
simply means that in certain limited situations, where for example they may be oc-
cupying territory or they may be based in a foreign State with the consent of that 
State, as is the case with both Iraq and Afghanistan, they are under an obligat ion to 
apply the ECHR and HRA in relation to persons who are in their custody. But it 
would be inconceivable for them to be required to apply human rights law to field 
operations on the battlefield, where the law of armed conflict is and will remain the 
applicable lex specialis. 
Court-Martial Proceedings 
Since the period of belligerent occupation in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional 
Authority in 2003-04, there have been two principal British courts-martial which 
resulted in the convictions of soldiers accused of transgressions in relation to the 
treatment of detainees in Iraq, as well as two other high-proftIe court-martial cases 
that failed for lack of evidence. The same facts that led to the civil proceedings in the 
AI-Skeini litigation, in relation to the death of Baha Mousa in British military cus-
tody, resulted in the court-martial of seven servicemen in the United Kingdom in 
2006. The trial, although not entirely a success, made legal history on two counts: it 
involved the first instance of a British soldier pleading guilty to a war crimes charge 
under the International Criminal Court Act 200 137 and it saw the first modern in-
stance of criminal charges being brought against senior British Army officers for 
dereliction of duty- in international law the basis for such a charge would have 
been the doctrine of command responsibility. Four soldiers of The Queen's 
Lancashire Regiment were charged with inhumane treatment of the Iraqi civilians 
in September 2006. Of these, one (Corporal Donald Payne) was additionally 
charged under the Army Act 1955}8 with manslaughter and pelVerting the course 
of justice, and another (Sergeant Kelvin Stacey) was charged with actual bodily 
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harm or assault. Two Intelligence Corps officers were charged with negligently per-
forming a duty, as was Colonel Jorge Mendonca, the regimental commander.39 
Corporal Payne pleaded not gUilty to manslaughter and perverting the course of 
justice but guilty to the charge of inhumane treatment of civilians and was sen-
tenced to dismissal from the Army and one year's imprisonment in consequence.40 
The other six accused were all acquitted due to lack of evidence.41 Although the 
charge against Colonel Mendonca was eventually thrown out,42 he was notable for 
being the highest-ranking British mili tary officer in modern history to be charged 
with a war crime, and particularly on command responsibility principles. When he 
subsequently decided to resign from the Army, despite his acquittal, rather than 
face possible further internal disciplinal)' action, there was much criticism of the 
Attorney General and the Army Prosecuting Authori ty, who were accused of treat-
ing him as a scapegoat. There is dearly a fine line to tread here. On the one hand, if 
there was not enough evidence to convict Colonel Mendonca of any crime, then it 
was obviously right that he was acquitted. But the cri ticism of putting him on 
court-martial simply "because the Army wanted to put an officer on t rial"H is be-
side the point: the system ofhicrarchy and command responsibility, whereby every 
commander is legally responsible for the troops under his command, is a lynchpin 
of the modern law of armed conflict. The case of Payne and Others teaches us that 
we should not shy away from calling senior officers to account when troops under 
their command commit criminal offenses. If the officer either ordered the crimes 
or knew or should have known that they were occurring and "failed to take all nec-
essary and reasonable measures" to "prevent or repress their commission or to 
submit the matter to the competent authorities fo r investigation and prosecu-
tion"44 then he must face investigation and, if appropriate, prosecution. It will not 
do to concentrate on the ordinary soldiers and non -commissioned officers who 
commit the actual abuse; they are easy targets fo r a prosecution. 
The Al-Skeini litigation and its associated cour ts-martial, al though the highest-
profile matter concerning treatment of detainees by British forces abroad, is not 
the only case that we have had in the United Kingdom. Two specific cases have 
gone to courts-martial within the last three years, al though one of them did not re-
sult in a full trial as Fusilier Gary Bartlam, the soldier concerned, pleadedguilty.45 
In TIle Queen v. Mark Paul Cooley, Darren Paul Larkin and Daniel Kenyon,-t6 the 
three accused (all non-commissioned officers in The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers) 
faced a total of nine charges under the Army Act.47 These included the same 
charges as in Bartlam in relation to the same facts and others, namely, forcing two 
detainees " to undress in front of others" and forcing two naked males "to simulate 
a sexual act." In addition, offenses of conduct to the prej udice of good order and 
military discipline (contrary to Section 69 of the Army Act) and committing a civil 
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offense (contrary to Section 70 of the Army Act) were also charged. The Section 69 
charges related to simulating the punching and kicking of an unknown male and 
(in the case of Corporal Kenyon, the most senior of the defendants) failing to re-
port unlawfu1 acts by soldiers under his command. The Section 70 charge involved 
the assault and beating of an unknown male who was being detained by British 
forces. All the incidents, both in Bartlam and in Cooley, Larkin and Kenyon, arose 
out of an operation in "Camp Breadbasket" in the British Zone of Iraq near Basra 
in May 2003, in which British troops rounded up a number of Iraqi civilians and 
proceeded to "work them hard" (as the British commanding officer apparently in-
structed his men). This vague order, coupled with apparent failures in reporting 
and supervision of conduct, led to several situations in which Iraqi detainees were 
physically and mentally abused by British soldiers. The specific acts alleged in-
cluded punching and kicking detainees, stripping them and forcing them to simu-
late sexual acts. One soldier stood on a detainee; a group of others tied another 
detainee to a forklift truck and raised him off the ground. Astonishingly, some of 
these misdeeds were photographed by some of the soldiers, and it was when one of 
the latter took his ftlm to be developed back in Britain that the matter was reported 
to the police for investigation. A particu1arly disturbing aspect of the case was the 
failure to bring charges against the officer who gave the original order and subse-
quently fa iled to supervise his men. However, Camp Breadbasket covered quite a 
large area and the particu1ar abuses that were the subject of the court-martial oc-
curred in a discrete area of the camp some distance from where the commanding 
officer was located, such that it would have been infeasible for him to have known 
what was going on. Consequently, the Army Prosecuting Authority did not feel 
that there was sufficient evidence to charge him with an offense under the doctrine 
of command responsibility. Of the actual defendants in the case, Larkin pleaded 
guilty to assault and was jailed for 140 days, while Kenyon and Cooley were both 
convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' and two years' imprisonment, re-
spectively . .f8 Cooley's sentence was subsequently reduced to four months' impris-
onment by the Army Reviewing Authority.49 
There has been much generalized concern as to allegations of ill-treatment ofci-
vilians (in some cases allegedly amounting to torture) by British troops in Iraq and 
the subsequent investigations into such conduct by those troopS.50 The issue re-
mains one of the greatest topical interest and a number of investigations are cur-
rently ongoing. $1 Only time will tell how many more cases arise and can be 
prosecuted. 
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Recent Legal Developments in the United States 
The long saga of detainee matters in the US courts has continued unabated and 
there have been interesting developments in two cases in particular: United States 
v. Hamdan and United States v. Khadr. 52 In June 2007, two different US military 
judges in two different sets of proceedings in military commissions threw out all 
charges in the two cases, on the grounds that the accused had not been properly de-
termined to be "unlawful enemy combatants" in terms of the Military Commis-
sions Act of2006; therefore all the charges were thrown out for lack of jurisdiction. 
In respect to Hamdan, the judge held that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal's 
(CSRT) determination that he was an "enemy combatant" was made for the pur-
pose of determining whether or not he was properly detained, rather than whether 
or not he was subject to trial by military commission, and using a different legal 
standard. He concluded: 
[Hamdan) is either entitled to the protections accorded to a PruonerofWar, or he is an 
al ien unlawful enemy combatant subject to the jurisdiction of a Military Commission, 
or he may have some other status. The Government [has] failed to determine, by 
means of a competent tribunal, that he is an "unlawful enemy combatant" using the 
definition established by Congress .... 53 
In respect to Khadr, the judge declared that "the military commission is not the 
proper authority, under the provisions of the [Military Commissions Act], to de-
termine that Me. Khadr is an unlawful enemy combatant in order to establish ini-
tial jurisdiction for this commission to try Me. Khadr."S4 The Court of Military 
Commissions Review (CMCR), however, has since reversed that ruling on the 
grounds that the distinction between "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy 
combatant" status was purely semantic and that the judge had erred in his conclu-
sion that a CSRT determination of "unlawful enemy combatant" status was a pre-
requisi te to trial by military commission, because the military commission itself 
had jurisdiction so to determine. 55 The CMCR accordingly reinstated the charges 
against Khadr, and the Department of Defense has now indicated that it intends to 
press ahead "expeditiously" with the full prosecutions ofKhadr and other detain-
ees in the same position.56 Although some might have thought that the twin rulings 
in June would provide a substantive obstacle to the entire system for the prosecu-
tion of detainees in the "War on Terror," throwing it into disarray and causing a 
general rethink on the part of the Pentagon, clearly the setback to the Administra-
tion's plans was only a temporary, procedural one. 
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The "Global War on Terror": Comments on the General Legal Framework 
In the last part of this article I will consider the broader issues mentioned at the be-
ginning, namely, the broader international legal framework that might govern the 
"Global War on Terror. " In short, is it an armed conflict or not? And if it is, then 
what kind of armed conflict is it? This is prompted by another detainee case that 
has been heard recently in the United States. It is not a military case but a civilian 
case: Af-Marri v. Wright,S7 in which the applicant is a civilian citizen of Qatar who 
was legally resident in the United States. AI-Macri had been detained by US mili-
tary authorities without charge and had been so detained for some four years. In 
brief, the Court of Appeals ruled that he could not be detained indefinitely by the 
military authorities and was entitled to habeas corpus. However, I do not intend to 
dwell on that aspect of the case, but rather on something else that the Court said, al-
most as an aside. It is in a couple of sentences in one of the paragraphs buried in the 
middle of the Court's opinion; it has apparently escaped the attention of most 
obselVers. 
The Court in Af-Marri said that because the US Supreme Court had determined 
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeftf58 that the armed conflict with AI-Qaeda is a conflict "not of 
an international character" and because there are no categories of combatants in 
non-international conflicts, neither lawful combatants nor unlawful combatants, 
the Military Commissions Act did not apply to AI-Marri and the only remaining 
possible classification of him was that he was a civilian.59 Because he was a civilian 
and legally resident in the United States, he was entitled to certain constitutional 
protections; as a civilian, he could not be transformed "into an enemy combatant 
subject to indefinite military detention, any more than allegations of murder in as-
sociation with others while in military selVice permit the Government to transform 
a civilian into a soldier subject to trial by court martial."60 This is interesting be-
cause it represents, in my opinion, one of the two best options for classifying de-
tainees in the "War on Terror" for the purposes of ensuring that they receive the 
benefit of the best possible treatment in captivity. 
This leads to a comparison of the Hamdan decision with the Israeli Supreme 
Court's decision on targeted killings6J and with certain aspects of the situation that 
the United Kingdom had in relation to Northern Ireland. The view of the plurality 
in Hamdan was that "there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions 
that applies here, even if the relevant conflict is not one between signatories."62 
This the plurality identified as Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
which applies as a minimum standard for humanitarian protection in all armed 
conflicts, although on the face of it the provision is directed specifically to armed 
conflicts not of an international character, in which it provides basic protection to 
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persons taking no active part in hostilities, including those placed Izors de combat 
by wounds or sickness and those who have surrendered or have otherwise been 
detained. The key to this part of the decision in Hamdan was the phrase "armed 
conflict not of an international character," a phrase which the plurality held to 
have a meaning "in contradistinction to a conflict between nations": effectively a 
negative definition, such that it could be interpreted as bringing within its ambit 
any and all armed conflicts that do not fit within the traditional inter-State armed 
conflict paradigm. The plurality asserted that this was the "literal meaning" of the 
phrase "armed conflicts not of an international character," and that in any event 
the intention behind the provision, while ostensibly restricted specifically to non-
international armed conflicts in the classic sense of international law, was for the 
purposes of its scope of application and protection to be as wide as possible.63 Of 
the dissenting opinions in Hamdan, only Justice Thomas dealt directly with the is-
sue of the nature ofthe conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda. He held 
that "the conflict with Al-Qaeda is international in character, in the sense that it is 
occurring in various nations around the globe. Thus, it is also occurring in the ter-
ritory of more than one of the High Contracting Parties. "64 Although he described 
the plurality's interpretation of the phrase "armed conflicts not of an international 
character" as "admittedly plausible" he nevertheless felt constrained by a judicial 
duty of deference to the Executive's determination of matters of war and peace.65 
So the plurality of the US Supreme Court held that the totality of the "Global 
War on Terror" is an armed conflict not of an international character, proceeding 
from what was essentially a functionalist perspective: the necessity to determine 
the legality of the military commissions established by President Bush, and apply-
ing a literalist reading of the letter of the law. Turning now to a comparison with 
the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court in respect to a much more limited sce-
nario-namely, Israel Defense Forces (IDF) actions against Palestinian militants in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in areas under the jurisdiction of the Pal-
estinian Authority-a much more holistic approach was applied by the Court in 
seeking to explain the whole legal framework underpinning IDF operations in this 
theater. The Israeli Supreme Court reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to 
that of its American counterpart, namely, that the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians is an international armed conflict. 
Most international lawyers outside the Middle East would have thought that 
that is a counterintuitive position to take, because normally for it to be an interna-
tional armed conflict, there have to be two or more States, and the Palestinians are 
not a State in international law. So it looks a bit unlikely from that perspective, al-
though there are other grounds on which it could be plausible. For example, areas 
that are still under Israeli occupation could be said to be still in a state of 
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international armed conflict by virtue of being under belligerent occupation. Con-
versely, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could not intuitively have 
been considered a non-international armed conflict either, because some parts of 
the Occupied Territories remain under the occupation ofIsrael and other parts are 
under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and in neither case are they le-
gally part of the State of Israel. So it cannot be a non-international armed conflict, 
because it is not occurring on the territory of only one State. The classification of 
the armed conflict was a point of agreement between the petitioners and the State. 
The latter made a very interesting point in its submissions: 
The question of the classification of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is a 
complicated question, with characteristics that point in different directions. In any 
case, there is no need to decide that question in order to decide the petition. That is 
because according to all of the classifications of anned conflict, the laws of armed 
conflict will apply to the acts of the State. These laws allow striking at persons who are a 
party to the armed conflict and take an active part in it, whether it is an international or 
a non-international anned conflict, and even if it belongs to a new category of armed 
conflict which has been developing over the last decade in international law. a category 
of anned conflicts between States and terrorist organisations. According to each of 
these categories, a person who is a party to the armed conflict and takes an active part in 
it is a combatant, and it is permissible to strike at him.66 
I think this is interesting for a number of reasons, one of which in this context is 
that it amounts to saying that many of the rules in armed conflicts are now basi-
cally the same. irrespective of the classification of the conflict in question, so it is not 
necessary to worry too much about whether the conflict is international or not. 
This is certainly a tendency that has been gathering force, albeit in the slightly dif-
ferent context of application of penal sanctions for violations of the law of armed 
conflict. since the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia began to develop some twelve years ago. To the extent that the 
State of Israel. through its counsel in this litigation, expressed the same view or a 
variant thereof. it could be viewed as an example of the accumulation of opinio 
juris on this point. 
The Supreme Court of Israel, nevertheless. did not choose to go down the par-
ticular path opened to it by the State's submissions on the character of the armed 
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead. it ruled simply that the appli-
cable law was that governing international armed conflicts and it did so for two 
particular reasons: 
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(1 ) the fact of the armed conflict crossing the frontiers of the State, i.e., the 
pre-1967 frontiers, and taking place within a context of belligerent 
occupation;67 and 
(2) by reference to the military capabilities of modern terrorist 
organizations. This point is, I think, of more general application than the 
specific situation that the Court was dealing with. 
The latter point, in particular, is quite innovative. The Court expressed it thus: 
The fact that the terrorist organisations and their members do not act in the name of a 
State does not turn the struggle against them into a purely internal State conflict. 
Indeed, in todars reality, a terrorist organisation is likely to have considerable military 
capabilities. At times, they have military capabilities that exceed those of States. 
Confrontation with those dangers cannot be restricted within the State and its penal 
law. Confronting the dangers of terrorism constitutes a part of the international law 
dealing with anned conflicts of an international character.l',s 
The decisions of the US and Israeli Supreme Courts in these two cases repre-
sent two alternative classifications of the "War on Terror," or at least certain as-
pects thereof, as an anned conflict. While I think that there is much to commend 
the contextual analysis that was adopted by the Israeli Court, the American ap-
proach seems somewhat literal by comparison. Nevertheless, at the very least the 
US Supreme Court decision might signal a resurgence of an emphasis on the use-
fulness of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.69 That can be broad-
ened for those States that are parties to Additional Protocol I to the "fundamental 
guarantees" contained in Article 75 thereof. What is innovative about the deci-
sion in Hamdatl in this particular respect is that it applies Common Article 3 to 
what is not really a non-international armed conflict as traditionally understood 
in international law at all, but might rather be called a transnational armed con-
flict. That is to say, the conflict is neither specifically international nor specifically 
non-international in nature within the traditional framework of the law of armed 
conflict, but it is transnational because it occurs in more than one State in the 
world simultaneously within the same context of hostilities. Common Article 3, 
in any event, is the lowest common denominator for humanitarian protection: it 
should have the widest scope of application possible, which essentially means it 
should be applied in all armed conflicts, no matter how they are classified. 
The Israeli decision, on the other hand, is seductive in the clarity and logic of its 
analysis. However, it is quite clear that the Court there was only seeking to deal 
with the situation as between Israel and Palestinian militants. Nevertheless, the 
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passages quoted above might be interpreted as suggesting that a broader, more 
sweeping statement of the law might have been intended, however peripherally, by 
the Court. 
Let me very briefly consider the Northern Ireland example, which is often men-
tioned as a predecessor in some ways for dealing with the "Global War on Terror." 
In terms of the latter phrase, the experience of Northern Ireland clearly shows that 
there is nothing new, at least rhetorically, in the use of such language. When the 
power of internment-indefinite detention without charge or trial-was intro-
duced in the province in 1972, its Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, said that North-
ern Ireland was "quite simply at war with the terrorist."70 The Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) tried to claim prisoner of war (POW) status for its operatives who had 
been detained by British security forces, a status which was not accepted by the 
British authorities.71 Indeed, the perspective of the British government was that the 
situation in Northern Ireland did not amount to an armed conflict of any kind in 
the sense of international law; the legal framework within which it operated in the 
United Kingdom being that of Military Aid to the Civil Power, wherein the armed 
forces were deployed in Northern Ireland pursuant to a request from the Northern 
Ireland government, which felt that the normal police forces could not contain the 
escalating situation and needed military assistance to restore law and order. It 
could not in any event have been an international armed conflict because Northern 
Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom. It could not have been an Additional Pro-
tocol i situation, as a war of national liberation, even though that is what the IRA 
sought to claim, firs t, because the United Kingdom was not at the time a party to 
Additional Protocol I, and second, because the IRA failed to make the declaration 
that is required of a national liberation movement under Article 96(3). Finally, it 
could not have been a situation under Additional ProtocollI, again because the 
United Kingdom was not at the time a party to that instrument. In any event, the 
threshold of application would not have been met by the IRA in terms of control of 
terri tory, and the violence was for the most part too sporadic and isolated to meet 
the Protocol's requirements. 
The contemporary British position in terms of the "Global War on Terror" as an 
armed conflict is that the United Kingdom does not accept the notion that such a 
"war" exists as an armed conflict of any classification in international law. Any de-
termination as to the type of an armed conflict in which British forces are engaged 
will be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts on the ground in each 
given situation .72 The legal basis of the decision in any event is the international law 
definition of an international or non-international armed conflict, in conjunction 
with the facts on the ground. If British forces are in action against the government 
or other official forces of any other State, the situation will be dealt with as one of 
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international armed conflict. In any other situation in which British troops are de-
ployed, the situation will be regarded as one of de facto non-international armed 
conflict. Thus, from the official UK point of view, hostilities that are currently tak-
ing place in Afghanistan and Iraq are in effect treated as internal conflicts in which 
the United Kingdom is participating on the side of the governments of those States. 
The conflict in Iraq, for example, is not a conflict between the British and Iraqi 
States: it is a conflict between the Iraqi State and Iraqi insurgents, and the former 
invited British troops to assist it in certain parts of Iraq in combating the insur-
gency.Although this might, again, seem a counterintuitive position to take, it is not 
entirely devoid of sense from a strictly legal perspective, in the same way that the 
US Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan has a certain logic to it. 
Concluding Remarks 
I think that there are six possibilities that we could consider in terms of the broad 
legal framework of the "Global War on Terror" in the sense of the law of armed 
conflict. 
( I) The "war" is an armed conflict and it is international in nature-that 
would essentially be an extension of what the Israeli Supreme Court held 
in the targeted killings case; 
(2) The "war" is an armed conflict and it is non-international in nature-
that is what the US Supreme Court said in Hamdan; 
(3) The "war" is an armed conflict and it has a new kind of hybrid status 
which might be described as a "transnational armed conflict"73-the 
issue here is going to be that if we call it a "transnational armed conflict" 
what actual rules do we apply? While this looks attractive as a 
classification in some respects because it is factually realistic in terms of 
the actual situation on the ground, it is not ultimately that helpful 
because it does not tell us much about the details of the law to be applied; 
(4) The "war" is an armed conflict and its precise classification in terms of 
the law of armed conflict does not really matter because in any event we 
will apply the minimum yardstick of Common Article 3 and-if the State 
in question is a party to Additional Protocol I-we are also going to apply 
the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75; 
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(5) The "war" does not constitute an overarching armed conflict for the 
purposes of international law-the various counterterrorist military 
operations which have been taking place since September 200 1 should be 
viewed as falling primarily within the framework of large-scale criminal 
law enforcement, albeit they are undertaken either largely or entirely by 
military forces; and 
(6) The "war" does not constitute an overarching armed conflict, but each 
individual counterterrorist military operation in the context thereof 
should be designated separately as either international or non-
international in nature, depending on the international law defmition 
and the facts on the ground-this is the position currently maintained by 
the British government. 
Ultimately, the most important issue here is the practical one of the standards 
according to which detainees captured in counterterrorist military operations are 
treated. The fundamental point is that the purpose of the law of anned conflict in 
the context of detainee treatment has to be to provide the maximwn amount of 
protection possible, and if that means applying Common Article 3 at the very least, 
then perhaps that is the best thing that we can do. But in some respects I would say 
that it should not even matter too much if we treat detainees as POWs. This is not 
the same thing as saying that they are POWs, just that we treat them as if they were 
POWs. It does not stop the State from prosecuting them after capture, and by do-
ing so we would be applying the maximum possible humanitarian protection and 
would be complying with the spirit and letter of Geneva Convention 1I1.74 
There is no logical reason, other than State pride, for this to be taken as a com-
mentary on the legitimacy or otherwise of the terrorist organizations-such atti-
tudes are in any event outmoded by the contemporary paradigm of asymmetrical 
warfare and the inevitable diminution in the importance of reciprocity as a pri-
mary basis of obligation in the international law of armed conflict. I concede that 
the view expressed herein is unlikely to be widely adopted at the present time, but it 
seems to me to be a rational and practical one. At the end ofthe day, the law in war 
has to protect detainees, and what we need is not more law but agreement on the 
basic parameters of applying Common Article 3, what that means in practice, and 
firm and consistent application of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I for those 
States that are parties thereto.75 
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